

E-police station

1. During the whole audited period, the preparation, as well as the implementation process, the Police Headquarters (KGP) did not prepare any formal planning documents of the E-police station project, that are required by the Police internal regulations on the conduction of any IT undertakings.

2. The E-police station project planning process was conducted without preparation and without due diligence. During the project implementation no reliable and up-to-date documents were created, that would concern the key areas subject to the planning process of an IT undertaking such as: aim of the application, implementation timetable and project financial plan. No parameters concerning hardware or software that would be used to operate E-police station were specified. Furthermore, the Police organisational needs connected with the provision of the hardware and software required to operate the application were not estimated. The KGP did not assess the maintenance costs of a newly built IT system. The analysis of legal requirements connected with the implementation of the application in the context of police practices was also not conducted. **In the case of the above mentioned project, the order of activities appropriate for IT undertakings was reversed, i. e. at first the product – the IT application – that was to be delivered the Police officers was commissioned and received, and only after that was the analysis on the legal, financial and technical conditions connected with the project implementation undertaken, what NIK assessed negatively.**

3. During the whole audited period no universe conception on how to implement the project was prepared by the KGP organisational units. The project was implemented during a conflict between the Police IT Department, responsible for the implementation of IT projects, and the Police Audit Department, that represents the end user of the application – the officers. **The decisions connected with the development of E-police station were made unanimously by the Police IT Department management together with Deputy Chief Police Officer, who supervises this organisational unit, without having thoroughly consulted the appropriate substantial units of the Police Headquarters and despite lack of interest in new functions on behalf of the users, that were the recipients of the system. The Chief Police Officer did not undertake any supervising measures in order to solve the occurred conflict and did not issue any guidelines, that would connect all of the**

stakeholders and which would concern the purpose, form and scope of the further project implementation.

4. KGP asked the Ministry of Interior and Administration (MSWiA) to commission the preparation of E-police station to the IT Projects Center (CPI - a public sector institution which answers to the Minister of Administration and Digitization), despite their own advanced work in the scope of system preparation and in spite of the fact that they were able to conduct this IT undertaking independently. In NIK's opinion the decision to commission an external entity with the preparation of the application was purposeless and hindered the effective implementation of the project.

5. NIK assess as purposeless and not credible the decision of KGP's Management to accept the CPI's proposition to finance the preparation and further the development of the E-police station application with EU funds intended for the implementation of ePUAP (Electronic Platform of Public Administration Services) project. The decision was made despite the suspected crime committed during the tender for the system preparation and despite the remarks submitted by the end users, concerning lack of purpose of the E-police station integration with ePUAP services. The audit results showed that three years after the completion of the product, the service enabling to submit notifications to the Police via the ePUAP platform was not provided to the citizens, what poses a threat to the project durability, required in case of undertakings financed with EU funds.

6. The management of the Police IT Department did not supervise the implementation and receipt of the agreement concluded between CPI and Netline company to create the E-police station application. Lack of credible activities caused the CPI to receive and pass to the Police officers a product that did not fulfil end-user expectations and did not provide effective handling of police tasks.

7. NIK assesses as purposeless and not credible the decision made by the former Deputy Chief Police Officer to develop E-police station and add functionalities dedicated to road traffic services and functionalities that concern the combination with Police central systems. The decision to develop the application was not preceded by a thorough analysis on the actual possibilities to implement the above mentioned functions in police practices. The Police commenced actions to obtain copyright to E-police station with a two-year delay. Copyright is crucial for a full exploitation of the developed system.

8. The E-police station application that cost additionally PLN 19 million (EUR 4,5 million or \$ 6,15 million) due to the preparation and provision of additional access hardware, has not yet been implemented into the police practices. In the Police organisational units audited by NIK the particular E-police station functionalities were used in a constrained way. Four out of the twelve audited entities did not use the system at all. A part of the purchased functionalities were not made accessible by the KGP to the Police officers and to the citizens at all. The hardware passed to the entities to operate E-police station was in most cases not used to work with the application. NIK also found cases of unsound management of the obtained devices by the Police units.

9. The KGP organisational units responsible for the implementation of E-police station did not conduct thorough and systematic activities in order to monitor the usage of the application by the Police field organisational units. Therefore, the decisions concerning the development of the system and its further development plans were made without thorough knowledge on the usefulness of the device and problems connected with its implementation.

10. The launch of E-police station application in the Police field organisational units was conducted illegally, because the Chief Police Officer did not fulfil the duties of data administrator, specified in article 36 of the Act on the Personal Data Protection, that concerned in particular the preparation of security policy and the instructions on how to manage the IT system. **This caused a threat to the integrity, confidentiality and accountability of the citizens' and police officers' personal data processed by the application. The Chief Police Officer took actions aiming at the elimination of breaches of law concerning the processing of personal data only after having received the information on the above mentioned irregularities from NIK auditors.**

11. During the audited period no formal training system for the application users was prepared. The trainings on how to use the first version of E-police station aimed at the Police officers were in most of the audited entities conducted in a cascade system, about half year before the Police officers obtained the hardware to operate the application. In most of the units there were no trainings conducted on the use of the system's second, developed version. The actions undertaken in order to prepare a training system for the users of E-police station were commenced by the Police IT Department only 1,5 year after the start of system implementation in Police units.

12. NIK established, that despite some of the purchased E-police station functionalities were not launched and despite lack of reliable knowledge on the state of the device's implementation in Police units, KGP planned further development of the application, by construction of a central database of proceedings and traffic incidents, collected in the E-police station. The costs of further development were estimated as PLN 15 million (EUR 3,6 million or \$ 4,8 million). NIK pointed out the need to stop further expenses on the development of e-posterunek until the KGP's Management makes binding decisions concerning the use of the device by the Police and until the established irregularities in the project implementation are eliminated.

Command Support System CSS

1. In the years 2008 – 2012, in connection with the Command Support System (CSS) project implementation, nine contracts were concluded, that concerned the construction, development and maintaining of the system, that cost almost PLN 68 million (EUR 16,3 million or \$ 21,7 million). The inspection conducted in KGP and in twelve Police organisational units confirmed that it is possible for the Police officers to use the system functionalities connected in particularly with the administration of notifications and events, patrol, force and resources management.

2. The Police Headquarters appointed organisational structures responsible for the implementation of CSS in the Police and a legal act was issued that regulates the system functioning and its implementation timetable. The preparation of CSS implementation was carried out in a reliable and systematic way in particular Police organisational units.

3. The Command Support System was implemented timely, on the 1st January 2013 and is used in practice, especially by the duty officers in Police organisational units in the whole country.

4. During the project implementation period there was no reliable (complex and up-to-date) concept of CSS construction, that would fulfil the requirements connected with the internal legal regulations on the conduction of an IT undertaking, being in force in the Police in 2005-2012 and that would include the project aims, construction timetable, full budget, financing sources and CSS maintenance. The project implementation was conducted as a series of independent undertakings, what hindered i. a. the application of EU subsidies.

5. KGP was not properly prepared to the application of EU subsidies granted to develop CSS. This fact resulted from an inaccurate planning process and lack of basic information, concerning the regulations of eligibility of expenses made from the EU subsidies. The audit also showed lack of coordination of activities aimed at obtaining EU funds among KGP organisational units.

6. KGP and CPI did not conduct a reliable and efficient cooperation in order to finance the CSS development. The management of both entities did not implement the provisions of concluded Agreements that regulate the cooperation, and adopted another coordination system, which did not enable an efficient task implementation. Corrective actions were commenced with a significant delay, as a result of which the primary EU subsidy in the amount of PLN 150 million (EUR 36 million or \$ 48,5 million) was decreased to PLN 58 million (EUR 14 million or \$ 18,7 million). What is more, a risk of non-application of most of the resources reserved for this aim occurred.

7. KGP did not conduct systematic and credible activities, aimed at the obtaining of copyright of the CSS being constructed by the Police. Despite the separation of CSS from the National Police Information System (KSIP) i. a. in order to obtain the possibility to develop the system by own force or by means of competitive tenders, for almost 1,5 year KGP did not commence actions aimed at obtaining the copyright to CSS. Therefore, all of the contracts with HP and Oracle to construct and develop the CSS were concluded as a result of a single-source procedures.

8. NIK assesses as unsound management the lack of appropriate application of five large format screens, worth in total PLN 65 thousand (EUR 15,6 thousand or \$ 21 thousand), obtained by KGP from CPI to apply CSS.

9. The Chief Police Officer fulfilled his duties of the administrator of personal data processed in CSS, by preparing privacy policy and user's manual for the system. The irregularities found in KGP and Police field organisational units concerned the non-compliance with the provisions of above mentioned documents, what caused a threat to the integrity and accountability of personal data being processed in CSS.

10. NIK noted that, despite the implementation of CSS from the 1st January 2013 as a basic working system of the Police organisational units, the formal training programme for the application users was not yet prepared. The trainings on the CSS operation were conducted in a cascade system and in the opinion of the Police officers, their level and number were in many cases not sufficient enough.